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Footer Logo

A BETTER WAR: THE UNEXAMINED VICTORIES AND FINAL
TRAGEDY OF AMERICA’S LAST YEARS IN VIETNAM
By L. Olivia Womack
In his exploratory book, A Better War, Lewis Sorley compares
the nature of the Vietnam War under General Creighton Abrams to his
to his predecessor, General William Westmoreland, arguing that, ‘a
better war’ was possible under the full direction of Abrams. From the
beginning of his command in 1964 until 1968, the strategy used by
Westmoreland had been primarily attrition warfare with ‘search and
destroy’ missions and large-scale unit operations. Westmoreland
focused on body count as a measure of the war, and repeatedly asked
Congress for more troops. Abrams replaced Westmoreland after the Tet
Offensive in 1968, and quickly enacted a contrasting war strategy.
Abrams’ ‘One War’ strategy focused equally on smaller unit ‘clear and
hold’ missions, pacification efforts in rural South Vietnam, and the
reinforcement of the South Vietnamese Army. 1 It became clear that
Abrams “demonstrated his understanding of the true nature of the war”
through this strategy. 2 Sorley proposes that Abrams’ strategy was more
effective and could have led to a victory for South Vietnam if that
strategy had been employed from the start of the war. In fact, Sorley
argues that by 1971 the South Vietnamese and American troops were
essentially winning the war under Abrams’ strategies. However,
declining public opinion and waning political support in the United
States led to the untimely withdrawal of U.S. troops and, ultimately, the
collapse of South Vietnam.
The ‘better war thesis’ is the core of Sorley’s work. It is a
compelling argument that a winning outcome for South Vietnam was
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possible, if only the strategy of General Abrams had been followed
from the start. Sorley’s thesis adds to the ever-expanding body of
scholarship on the Vietnam War. By exploring the later years of the
war, Sorley analyzes a part of the war that had been previously
overlooked. Sorley has written four books on the later years of
Vietnam, greatly contributing the body of scholarship about this time
period, especially regarding the comparison of the strategies of
Westmoreland and Abrams. These works include Thunderbolt: General
Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, and Westmoreland: The
General Who Lost Vietnam. In his Acknowledgments, Sorley describes
how he painstakingly collected the new and previously classified
information that makes up the bulk of his work. As a veteran himself,
Sorley used his military connection to gain access to what he calls
“Abrams’ Special Collection,”: 455 tape recordings from U.S. Military
Headquarters in Vietnam during the time of Abrams’ command. 3 This
newly found primary source has illuminated the leadership of Abrams
and influenced the way historians view this complex war. Most
importantly, his analysis provides an original argument about the war’s
end.
A Better War and Sorley’s historical thesis have changed the way
many view the later years of the Vietnam War. Sorley’s arguments are
persuasive and “seductive,” as one reviewer states. 4 However, under
closer inspection, it seems that Sorley’s analysis is idealistic and
overreaching at times. Many reviews dispute Sorley’s claim that a
better war was possible under Abrams. Gentile, in his review in The
National Interest, contends that the Vietnam War was never actually
winnable based on the costs Americans were willing to pay in blood
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and treasure. 5 Another review maintains that Sorley “ultimately does
not convince” historians that, had Abrams been the General for the
entire war, South Vietnam would have prevailed. 6 Not only have
scholars disagreed with Sorley’s thesis, but recent published works
refute some of his key points. In an article for The Journal of Military
History, Andrew Birtle rebuts the claim that Abrams’ tactics in Vietnam
were more effective. Sorley claimed that a 1965 study of the progress
in Vietnam had disagreed with Westmoreland’s ‘search and destroy’
tactics and thus revealed a need for Abrams’ new strategy. Birtle
demonstrates that this 1965 study actually did the opposite as it
conclusively supported Westmoreland’s tactics. 7 Additionally, Graham
Cosmas argues that there were more similarities than differences
between the tactics of Westmoreland and Abrams. 8
Despite the criticisms and rebuttals, A Better War made a major
contribution to the study of the later years of the Vietnam War and the
leadership of General Abrams. Sorley persuasively argues that there
could have been a better war in Vietnam if only Abrams had been in
charge from the beginning. Sorley conveys that under Abrams, the U.S.
and South Vietnamese forces had victory in sight, yet public support in
the United States forced the withdrawal of U.S. troops that preceded the
fall of South Vietnam. Whether a historian agrees with this thesis or
not, most can agree that Sorley’s work has added greatly to the
scholarship and has renewed the discussion of Vietnam War’s severe
complexity.
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